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Abstract.  Electronic business motivates automatic bargaining: computers may not be as good bargainers as expert 
human bargainers, but by talking to a large number of traders on the Internet, they stand a better chance of getting 
good deals. While an end-seller may be interested in getting the highest profit from each negotiation, traders have to 
balance between making large profits in few deals (thus missing opportunities in the failed negotiations) and making 
smaller profits in larger number of deals. When a deal is to be constructed through a chain of middlemen, these 
middlemen have to cooperate (in order to construct the deal) while trying to maximize their own profits. The 
middlemen can be seen as propagating constraints along the chain, with the aim to maximize its profit while 
satisfying all the bargainers constraints (failing that, the chain will break down). In this paper, a simple chain-
bargaining problem is defined. It is used to study constraint propagation strategies, which are essential components 
of automatic bargaining.  
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1 Introduction 
With the growth of activities on the Internet, more machines have to communicate with each other Computer bargaining 
is quite different from human bargaining, where psychology, emotion, (in the case of audio communication) tone, (in the 
case of face to face bargaining), eye contact, appearance and facial expressions could all play important parts. There is a 
need to develop automatic (algorithmic) bargaining agents [11][15][20][21]. Although computer programs may not be as 
good as human bargainers, programs can talk to many more potential partners. The more potential partners in a free market 
a trader talks to, the more chance it has in finding good deals.  This motivates the study of automatic bargaining programs.  
An end-users objective is obviously to minimize the cost, possibly through hard bargains. Utility may fall as the 
negotiation takes longer. The end-user (or supplier) may also have to purchase (sell) within a time limit. These factors 
motivate compromises. For a trader, the failure to strike a deal in situations where there is room for profit means loss of 
opportunity. In most cases opportunities are limited or involve costs.  A trader may attempt to (a) making large profits in 
fewer deals or (b) making smaller profits in larger number of deals. How could it find a good balance between the two? 
What makes a good strategy?  
In this paper, we focus on a fundamental chain-bargaining problem where a number of middlemen stand between the 
supplier and the end-customer. The supplier, the middlemen and the end-customer form a chain. For a deal to be 
completed, all members of the chain must agree on the prices with their corresponding suppliers/buyers. Therefore, 
members of the chain must balance between cooperation and competition.  The middlemen can be seen as propagating 
constraints along the chain, with the aim to satisfy all the bargainers constraints. The constraint of a supplier or middleman 
is to sell (within a limited amount of time) at a price above its cost. The constraint of an end-customer is to buy (within a 
limited amount of time) at a price below its utility.  
Game theoreticians have long been studying bargaining strategies, e.g. see [2][3][4][14]. Optimal strategies have been 
found for many problems. The game theoretic approach is attractive because it is neat, and results often have provable 
properties. Realistic applications are far more complex than those studied by game theoreticians so far [9][11]. This 
motivates research by the agents community, e.g. see [10][11][20][21][23]. By using computer programs and simulations, 
complex strategies in game theory can be evaluated and verified. Agent technology overlaps with constraint satisfaction 
[6][18][22] in distributed constraint satisfaction, e.g. see [13][16][17][24][25]. 
In an earlier paper, we introduced the Simple Constrained Bargaining Game, CBG(S), where one buyer bargains with 
one seller (to be recapitulated below) [19]. In this paper, the game is extended to chain bargaining. New strategies are 
introduced. These strategies will be combined to form middlemen. We shall analyse the effectiveness of different 
middlemen in chain-negotiation and attempt to identify components that make good middlemen. 
2 The Chain Constrained Bargaining Game 
In an earlier paper, we introduced the Simple Constrained Bargaining Game (CBG(S)) [19]. It involves a buyer and a 
seller. Only one commodity is involved, for which the seller has a cost and the buyer a utility. Both sellers and buyers have 
time limits within which they have to sell/buy. They do not know each others cost and time constraint.  
The Simple Constrained Bargaining Game, CBG(S): 
The game involves a buyer and a seller.  
(i) The seller is constrained by a cost and the number of days within which it has to sell (DTS); 
(ii) The buyer is constrained by a utility and the number of days within which it has to buy (DTB); 
(iii) The seller does not have any information about the buyer's utility and DTB;  
(iv) The buyer does not have any information about the seller's cost and DTS; 
(v) The players make alternative bids, with the seller to bid first;  
(vi) Each player bids exactly once per day; 
(vii) When both players bid for the same price, a sale is agreed; 
(viii) If a sale cannot be agreed before a player runs out of time, the negotiation terminates; no penalty is paid 
by either player; 
(ix) This is a one-off game: neither player has information about the others past behaviour and performance.  
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For example, the seller may have a cost of 100 and it may have to sell within 12 days. The commodity may have a 
utility of 500 to the buyer, who has to buy within 16 days. The seller may start the bid at, say, 215. The buyer may counter-
offer 53, which the seller may counter-offer 192, and the bargain continues until, say, the seller asks for 120 on or before 
day 12 which the buyer accepts. It is possible that no sale is agreed before one side (in the above example, the seller) runs 
out of time.  
Success of a buyer/seller in one game depends to some extent on luck. However, if enough players play many games 
against each other, we may find some players better than others. If every pair of players was given the same set of 
problems, success of a player can be measured by comparing its profit against those by other players. Therefore, 
performance of a player depends on what other players are involved in the game. The question is whether optimal strategies 
exist, and if so, what they look like.  
This is an interesting problem because it extends what has been done in game theory to something that is still 
manageable. Given enough effort, it may even be possible to find evolutionary stable solutions. The game forms the basis 
of more realistic situations which involve more constraints than just cost, utility, sell by dates and buy by dates.  
In this paper, we introduce the Chain Constrained Bargaining Game (CBG(C)), which extends the CBG(S). The 
CBG(C) involves an end-seller, an end-buyer and an ordered list of middleman.  
The Chain Constrained Bargaining Game, CBG(S): 
The game involves an end-seller, an end-buyer and an ordered list of middlemen, which form a chain: 
[End_Seller, Middleman_1, , Middleman_N, End_Buyer] 
(i) The end-seller is constrained by a cost and the number of days within which it has to sell (DTS); 
(ii) The end-buyer is constrained by a utility and the number of days within which it has to buy (DTB); 
(iii) Each middleman is made up of a buyer and a seller; a middleman may have its own time constraints for 
completing the negotiations;  
(iv) A middleman can only buy from its preceding seller, which is either the end-seller or a predetermined 
middleman. It can only sell to its succeeding buyer, which is either the end-buyer or a predetermined 
middleman. 
(v) The end-seller, end-buyer and middlemen all have no information about each others constraints. 
(vi) The game is started by the end-seller making its initial offer to the first middleman; 
(vii) Control is passed from the end-seller to the first middleman, the second middleman, , until it reaches 
the end-buyer when this process is reversed; 
(viii) When a middleman receives control from its predecessor, it will make an offer to its successor unless sale 
has been agreed. If sale has already been agreed, it simply passes control to its successor; 
(ix) When the end-buyer receives an offer, it will make a counter-offer to the last middleman in the chain; 
(x) When a middleman receives control from its successor in the chain, it will make a bid to its predecessor 
unless sale has been agreed. If sale has already been agreed, it simply passes control to its predecessor; 
(xi) Each player bids no more than once per day; 
(xii) When two adjacent players bid for the same price, a sale is agreed between them; 
(xiii) When every pair of adjacent players has agreed on the prices, chain negotiation is completed. Profit of 
each middleman is measured by the difference between its selling price (utility) and its buying price 
(cost); 
(xiv) If a sale cannot be agreed before any player in the chain runs out of time, negotiation in the whole chain 
terminates. No player earns any profit, even if it has already agreed on prices with its predecessor and 
successor; no penalty is paid by any player; 
(xv) Neither player has information about the others past behaviour and performance.  
The CBG(C) game provides a context for studying an elementary issue in chain negotiation: the issue of how to 
propagate constraints within a limited amount of time in an environment in which cooperation is required amongst parties 
with competing goals.  
3 Strategies for CBG(C) 
When the utility of the buyer is higher than the cost of the seller, there is opportunity for players in the chain to make 
profits. This is the incentive for all the players to complete a chain in CBG(C). For reference, we call the range between the 
cost and the utility the profitable region.  
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Within the profitability region, agents would try to maximise their own profit. This is the incentive for players to drive 
hard bargains. However, when a player has a limited number of opportunities in chain negotiation, the cost of not 
completing a chain is the loss of potential profit. To succeed, a player has to balance between maximizing its own profit 
(possibly through hard bargaining) and giving its trading partners room for profit, a form of cooperation.  
In Tsang and Gosling (2002), experiments on a number of buyers and sellers have been reported [19]. The top players 
in that paper are joined by top players in a tournament held at University of Essex to form the experiments in the current 
study. Each player contains a number of rules. Some of these players are complex and best understood by studying their 
source codes, which is available in [26]. Their general rules are briefly summarised below. In the summaries below, we 
sometimes omit the simple strategy that all the players bid the bottom line plus a predetermined (player-dependent) 
minimum profit on the last day.  
The Jacob-Seller (dgjaco_s)  
This seller accepts bids that are above the cost by a predefined margin, or when it judges (based on the bids 
history) that the buyer has reached its limit. The general rule is as follows: to start, it offers the cost plus a 
predefined premium. This offer is reduced linearly until 4th final day. It then offers cost plus a target profit 
(parameter to the program) for one move. The penultimate move makes an obvious drop in price to tempt the 
buyer. A minimum profit is demanded in the final offer. 
The Keen-Seller-2 (keen_s2) 
This simple seller (reported in [19]) is keen to make deals as soon as the bid is above its cost. However, when time 
is available, it attempts to get a better deal by delaying commitment by one round. The general strategy is to start 
by offering a very high price, and then reduce it by half towards the cost in each round. 
The Stubbings-Seller (pmstub_s)  
Unless special cases are detected, such as the buyer has bid below the cost of pmstub_s, the general rule is to 
offer 22 drr
MCMC ×+ , where MC is the minimum price, which is set at 60% above cost, 1+r is the given 
number of days to sell and d is the number of days gone. In other words, it drops its offering prices at an increasing 
rate, till the last day. Pmstub_s also attempts to judge whether the buyer has reached its limit. This is done by 
checking the ratio )(1
)(1
32
21
bb
bb
+
+  is below 10%, where b1, b2 and b3 are the last, last but one and last but two bids. 
The Stacey-Seller (rpstac_s)   
This is a complex seller that uses 18 rules to handle different situations. It drives a hard bargain by various sensible 
means. For example, when the bid is above cost, the bid is accepted if (i) the last two bids are 50% above cost, (ii) 
the last three bids are 25% above cost or (iii) the last four bids are 15% above cost. The final two days strategies 
are fine tuned with 7 rules covering various situations depending on its predetermined margin thresholds and the 
buyers latest offer. When no specific rules are applicable, offer price is reduced by 7.5% of the cost per round as 
long as the offer is above cost.  
The Smart-Seller-4 (smart_s4) 
This seller was reported in [19]. A Target is worked out, principally based on an estimation of the pattern of the 
buyers previous bids. Up to three bids are used to project the buyers next bid. It continues to bargain until it runs 
out of time, or it believes the buyer has reached its bottom line and the bid is above its cost.  
The Keen-Buyer (keen_b)  
This simple buyer (modified from the version reported in [19]) is keen to make deals. It accepts any offer that is 
below its utility. The overall strategy is to bid a low price to start with, and then reduce it by half towards the 
utility in each round.  
The Progressive-Buyer-2 (progress_b2) 
This buyer was reported in [19]. The idea is to divide the utility value by the DTB, increasing the bid gradually. 
This gives the seller a chance to chart its progress and predict its bottom line. The underlying philosophy is that 
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this gives the seller a chance to cooperate should the seller wants to. When the offer is below the utility, it is 
accepted if (a) there are less than 3 days left; or (b) the latest offer is within 95 and 100% of the previous offer 
(this is seen to be a sign of the seller reaching its limit). 
The Tryhorn-Buyer (mjtryh_b)  
This buyer is built upon two important modules: (a) a predictor that estimates the bottom line of the seller and (b) a 
purchase-adviser that decides whether an offer is acceptable. The predictor attempts to compute the arithmetic 
progress of the sellers offers. Complex rules were used to compute the next bid, but in general, drives a hard 
bargain by not raising its bids very much until late in the negotiation. An offer is acceptable if it is the buyers last 
day to buy. Whether an offer is acceptable depends on (a) the offer/utility ratio (the lower the better) and (b) the 
length of the negotiation (the longer the negotiation, the keener it is to accept the offer).  
The Sourtzinos-Tsang-Buyer (psourt_b)  
This buyer uses a combination of bidding rules. In brief, it bids 1000th of the sellers first offer, and 100th of its 
second offer, as long as the bids are below its utility. Otherwise, the general rule is used, which is to bid the 
fraction of the utility that reflects the ratio between the utility and the sellers last offer, i.e. offerLast
Utility
_
2
.  
The Stacey-Buyer (rpstac_b)  
This is a complex buyer that uses 20 rules to handle different situations. It drives a hard bargain by various 
sensible means. For example, even when the offer is below its utility, it delays acceptance. It refuses to raise its bid 
if the seller has not lowered its price for three rounds. The final two days strategies are fine tuned with 6 rules 
covering various situations depending on its preferred margin (which is 35%) and the sellers latest offer. One 
general rule is to increase the offer by 7.5% per round as long as the bid is below utility.  
4 Experiment 1: Bargaining With No Middlemen Involved 
Buyers and sellers form the components of chains. To help us understand chain negotiation better, the individual buyers 
and sellers are played against each other to evaluate their relative strength. One of the questions that we would like to 
answer later is: will successful buyers / sellers make good components for middlemen?  
A Chain Mediator (Version 4.2.1) is used for conducting large-scale experimentation among a set of sellers and buyers. 
Five sellers are five buyers are used in all the experiments reported in this paper. Sellers and buyers are paired up and 
played against each other. This means 25 games are played in each experiment. Each seller is played against each buyer in 
1,000 randomly generated problems. In our earlier work, we learned that the relative performance between players varies 
depending on the size of the profitable region (end-buyers utility minus end-sellers cost). Therefore, we ran experiments 
with different sizes of profitable regions. In all experiments, costs were randomly generated between 101 and 300. For low-
profit experiments, utilities were randomly generated between 301 and 500. For high-profit experiments, utilities were 
generated between 1001 and 1300. Both buyers and sellers were given a random number of days, generated between 3 and 
20, to buy and sell. The parameters used in the experiments throughout this paper are shown in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Parameters used in the experiments 
  
Parameter set ID p1 p2 p4 
Min Cost 101 101 101 
Max Cost 300 300 300 
Min Days to Sell 3 3 3 
Max Days to Sell 20 20 20 
Min Utility 1001 301 5101 
Max Utility 1300 500 5300 
Min Days to Buy 3 3 3 
Max Days to Buy 20 20 20 
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The performance of the players are summarised in Table 2. The profits are normalized for comparability between the 
two different runs. The normalised results are presented in Figure 3. It is important to note that the performance of a player 
depends on the population profile.  
 
Table 2: Average Profits in Pairwised Negotiations 
Player 
Low 
profit 
High 
profit 
Profit 
over all 
games 
dgjaco_s 101 169 270 
keen_s2 68 295 363 
pmstub_s 99 398 497 
rpstac_s 76 430 506 
smart_s4 67 329 396 
keen_b 49 452 501 
mjtryh_b 96 681 777 
progress_b2 57 542 599 
psourt_b 95 522 617 
rpstac_b 122 690 812 
Mean 83.00 450.80 533.80 
Standard Deviation 21.85 156.63 163.91 
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Figure 3: Normalized Profit in pairwise negotiations 
 
The results shown here agree with our early results. Performance of the players varies depending on the size of the 
profitable region. As we found out in the past, the most dramatic example was the seller dgjaco_s, which was the champion 
seller when the profitable region was narrow, but poorest seller when the profitable region was wide. There is probably 
room for improving its game in highly profitable situations. The results are also consistent with earlier results in that the 
buyers generally scored higher than sellers. One plausible explanation is that, if the seller and buyer have the same time 
limit, the buyers have the last chance to bid.  
Results in Figure 3 show that when the profitable region is wide, mjtryh_b and rpstac_b (both hard-bargainers) are the 
most successful buyers and pmstub_s and rpstac_s are the most successful sellers. When the profitable region is small, 
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rpstac_b is by far the most successful buyer and dgjaco and pmstub are the most successful sellers. Overall, one can say 
that rpstac_b is the most successful and reliable buyer, followed by mjtryh_b. pmstub_s and rpstac_s are the most 
successful sellers.  
To gain better understand of the aggregate scores, the individual pairwise results are recorded, as shown in Table 4. We 
also compute the percentage of potential profits that each pair of players realized  that is the total scores between two 
players divided by the summation of utility minus cost in all the games (bear in mind that the same set of games are played 
by every pair of players). For example, the realization rate between dgjaco_s and progress_b2 is (140.5 +  703.4) / 949.9  
89%. The results are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 4: Average profit per game between each pair of players 
(Parameter set p1, 1,000 games between each pair of players, average potential profit per game is 949.9) 
 keen_b progress_b2 mjtryh_b psourt_b rpstac_b Average 
dgjaco_s 200.0  749.9  140.5  703.4  143.3  806.6  200.0  749.9  161.5  788.4  169.1 
keen_s2 553.2  396.7  54.1  703.6  162.8  787.1  443.2  506.7  263.4  686.5  295.3 
pmstub-s 434.3  515.6  400.2  481.9  372.9  577.0  429.8  520.1  352.1  597.8  397.9 
rpstac_s 661.6  288.3  201.3  343.0  430.1  510.1  551.8  398.1  305.7  644.2  430.1 
smart_s 605.9  311.7  254.8  476.0  185.0  723.4  379.6  434.4  218.0  731.9  328.7 
Average  452.4  541.6  680.9  521.8  689.7  
 
Table 5: Percentage of potential profit realized between each pair of players 
 keen_b progress_b2 mjtryh_b psourt_b rpstac_b 
Average 
realization 
dgjaco_s 100% 89% 100% 100% 100% 98% 
keen_s2 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 96% 
pmstub-s 100% 93% 100% 100% 100% 99% 
rpstac_s 100% 57% 99% 100% 100% 91% 
smart_s 97% 77% 96% 86% 100% 91% 
Avg gain per game 99% 79% 99% 97% 100% 95% 
 
If we pay attention to rpstac_s, the best performed seller of all, we can see that keen_b contributed heavily to its high 
scores (rpstac_s scored 661.6 when keen_b scored 288.3). In fact, rpstac_s scored less than progress_b2 (201.3 vs 343.0), 
mjtryh_b (430.1 vs 510.1) and rpstac_b (305.7 vs 644.2). The fact is, all other sellers scored less than these buyers. It is 
also worth paying attention to the fact that rpstac_s realized 99% to 100% of the potential profits with most buyers, but did 
it badly with progress_b2  together they only realized 57% of the profits.  
Amongst the buyers, progress_b2 managed to beat all its opponents in pairwise competition. It scored heavily against 
keen_s (703.6 vs 54.1). However, on average, progress_b only realized 79% of the potential profits with its opponents. 
Progress_b2 is quite willing to raise its bids. The low realization rate suggests that progress_b2s strategy for recognizing 
deadlines may be problematic.  
The best performed buyers, mjtryh_b and rpstac_b were successful not just because they manage to gain more profit 
than their opponents, but also because they did not miss much opportunities. Despite the fact that they drive hard bargains, 
they realized 99% (mjtryh_b) and 100% (rpstac_b) of all the profits with its opponents. This suggests that between these 
buyers and their opponents, deadlines were recognized most of the time. 
5 Experiment 2: Chains with Mixed Middlemen 
A middleman is made up of a buyer and a seller. While it is possible to implement dedicated middlemen we would like 
to find out whether the buyers and sellers that we have studied so far could be used to make up good middleman. 
Furthermore, we would like to find out what components (buyers and sellers) make up successful middlemen.  
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We generated chains with one, five and ten random middlemen between an end-seller and an end-buyer. For chains 
with one middleman, we generated 1,000 chains. Each chain is run on 100 problems generated from the low and high profit 
problems as described in the previous section. This gives each player (end-seller, end-buyer or middleman) over 8000 
occurrences in the runs for statistical reliability. For chains with five middlemen, problems were generated from parameter 
p1 in Table 1 (for low profit  as profits between 701 and 1299 is to be shared by seven players in each chain) and p4 (for 
high profit). Only 20 games were played by each chain, as there would be enough scorings to be collected in each chain to 
make the results statistically reliable (on average 4000 data points per player per parameter set). The same applied to chains 
with ten middlemen. Scores are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Scores in Mixed Chains  Average Profits Per Game 
Length of chain 1 1 5 5 10 10 
Parameter Set p2 p1 p1 p4 p1 p4 
dgjaco_s- 40 115 6 18 0 2 
keen_s2- 13 90 1 3 1 0 
pmstub_s- 37 242 14 52 1 6 
rpstac_s- 28 186 5 29 1 2 
smart_s4- 19 172 5 30 1 3 
keen_b-dgjaco_s 30 141 9 43 2 17 
keen_b-keen_s2 23 218 14 107 1 20 
keen_b-pmstub_s 41 350 18 203 2 26 
keen_b-rpstac_s 33 193 11 149 1 16 
keen_b-smart_s4 22 165 14 119 2 21 
mjtryh_b-dgjaco_s 38 221 9 114 2 7 
mjtryh_b-keen_s2 31 260 12 138 3 16 
mjtryh_b-pmstub_s 37 463 16 205 2 17 
mjtryh_b-rpstac_s 33 284 9 165 1 13 
mjtryh_b-smart_s4 32 277 12 157 1 16 
progress_b2-dgjaco_s 31 187 9 106 1 19 
progress_b2-keen_s2 26 224 15 144 1 24 
progress_b2-pmstub_s 32 315 19 212 1 30 
progress_b2-rpstac_s 25 240 15 176 2 22 
progress_b2-smart_s4 20 207 16 204 2 33 
psourt_b-dgjaco_s 49 170 10 82 2 11 
psourt_b-keen_s2 37 219 12 139 2 15 
psourt_b-pmstub_s 35 362 19 216 5 20 
psourt_b-rpstac_s 30 275 11 112 1 11 
psourt_b-smart_s4 27 191 13 158 2 18 
rpstac_b-dgjaco_s 43 282 15 143 2 21 
rpstac_b-keen_s2 30 270 18 164 2 26 
rpstac_b-pmstub_s 35 375 20 208 1 27 
rpstac_b-rpstac_s 31 271 15 147 3 26 
rpstac_b-smart_s4 39 278 17 155 2 29 
keen_b- 17 182 4 59 1 8 
mjtryh_b- 36 335 13 256 1 14 
progress_b2- 18 253 24 325 2 65 
psourt_b- 41 312 17 223 4 27 
rpstac_b- 47 431 25 303 0 62 
Mean 31.6 250.17 13.20 144.69 1.66 19.71 
Standard Deviation 8.4 82.32 5.32 75.79 0.98 13.68 
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It is interesting to observe that results on problems generated using parameter p1 produced very low average profits for 
chains with 10 middlemen. The profitable region in problems generated with parameter p1 is between 701 and 1299. 
Shared between 12 players in each chain, there should be, on average, profit regions of 58 to 108 in each negotiation. 
Experimental results show that the average profit per game per player was less than 2. One plausible explanation is that in 
long chains, it only takes one uncompromising player to prevent the chain completing (leading to zero profit to all players 
in the chain). This will be further examined later. 
The scores were normalized (by column in Table 6) so that results from different runs can be compared and combined. 
Results with chain length 10, parameter set p1 were discarded, as the scores were too low to be significant. Normalized 
results are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Normalized Profit in chains with mixed middlemen
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Figure 7: Normalized profits for players in chains with mixed middlemen 
 
Figure 7 shows that results are sensitive to length of the chains. For chains with single middleman, (mjtryh_b, 
pmstub_s) was by far the best performer. In fact, all middlemen that used pmstub_s as their buyers performed rather well.  
As the length of the chains grow, profits of end-buyers progress_b2 and rpstac_b increase. No middlemen appeared to 
dominate the game in chains of length 5 and 10, though some performed than average; e.g. (progress_b2, smart_s4), 
(progress_b2, pmstub_s), (keen_b, pmstub_s) and (rpstac_b, pmstub_s). Overall, 7 middlemen (keen_b, pmstub_s), 
(progress_b2, pmstub_s), (psout_b, pmstub_s), (rpstac_b, dgjaco_s), (rpstac_b, pmstub_s), (rpstac_b, rpstac_s), (rpstac_b, 
smart_s4) all scored above average in chains of all length in the experiment.  
The performance of (progress_b2, pmstub_s) is worth highlighting. It performed consistently in chains of length 1, 5 
and 10. Recall from Table 5, progress_b2 has a relatively lower rate of realizing profits (79% on average). On its own, 
progress_b2 was only an average buyer. But combined with pmstub_s, it formed part of a consistently successful 
middleman. This perhaps highlights the difficulties in finding good combinations of buyers and sellers to form middlemen.     
To understand the results better, a number of runs were studied in details. Following is the results of one particular run 
with four middlemen in a chain that contains all the players described in this paper. Both end-sellers and end-buyers have 8 
days to sell/buy. The cost is 200 and the utility is 1200, which means there is a profitable region of 1000. Negotiations are 
presented in lists, in reverse chronological order. For readability, all sellers offers are preceded by + and all buyers bids 
are preceded by -. 
  Page 10 
End-seller: dgjaco_s, cost 200 
[-240, +240, -0, +290, -0, +290, -0, +317, -0, +345, -0, +372, -0, +400] 
Middleman 1: (mjtryh_b, keen_s2) 
[-290, +290, -0, +340, -0, +390, -0, +491, -0, +666, -0, +988, -0, +1604] 
Middleman 2: (progress_b2, pmstub_s) 
[+632, -632, +703, -2, +925, -2, +1136, -2, +1496, -2, +2087, -2, +3146, -2, +5132] 
Middleman 3: (rpstac_b, rpstac_s) 
[+973, -973, +17374, -891, +18783, -788, +20307, -642, +21954, -410, +23735, -6, +25660] 
Middleman 4: (keen_b, smart_s4) 
[+1055, -1055, +36150, -995, +45539, -935, +54458, -875, +62996, -815, +71205, -103, +102640] 
End-buyer: psourt_b, utility 1200 
Profits: dgjaco_s: 40, (mjtryh_b, keen_s2): 50, (progress_b2, pmstub_s): 342, (rpstac_b, rpstac_s): 341, 
(keen_b, smart_s4): 82, psourt_b: 145 
 
With a cost of 200, end-seller dgiaco_s started the chain negotiation by offering 400 to the middleman (mjtryh_b, 
keen_s2), who saw it as its potential cost. Middleman (mjtryh_b, keen_s2) in turn offered 1,604 to the middleman 
(progress_b2, pmstub_s), who marked it up to 5,132 and offered to (rpstac_b, rpstac_s). This carries on until the offer of 
102,640 reached the end-buyer psourt_b, who counter-offered 103 (as explained before, -103 should be read as bid of 
103 by seller psourt_b rather than negative 103) to middleman (keen_b, smart_s4). Bids of 6, 2 and 0 were passed from 
one middleman to another until 0 was bid to the end-seller.  
The first sale was agreed on day 7 (one day before its own deadline), when middleman (rpstac_b, rpstac_s), which had 
an offer of 703 for its approval from (progress_b2, pmstub_s), accepted the bid of 973 by (keen_b, smart_s4). This was 
followed by (keen_b, smart_s4)s acceptance of the end-buyers bid of 1055, confirming its profit of (1055-973=) 82. Later 
but still on day 7, middleman (rpstac_b, rpstac_s) refused to accept the offer of 703 by (progress_b2, pmstub_s), which 
would have given it a profit of (973-703=) 270. Instead, (rpstac_b, rpstac_s) counter-offered 632 to (progress_b2, 
pmstub_s). With this offer by its buyer, (progress_b2, pmstub_s) accepted the offer of 290 by (mjtryh_b, keen_s2)., who in 
turn accepted the offer of 240 by end-seller dgjaco_s, taking a profit of (290-240=) 50. On day 8, the final day, 
(progress_b2, pmstub_s) accepted the bid of 632 by (rpstac_b, rpstac_s), taking the profit (973-632=) 341.  
What we have learned from analysing the above and other scenarios is that, in general, whenever a hard-bargaining 
seller (buyer) is present in a chain, high cost (low utility) is imposed to the next middleman. In the above example, when 
middleman (rpstac_s and rpstac_b) was offered 5,132 by its supplier, it offered 25,660 to the next middleman (targeting a 
staggering profit of 20,532). Subsequent bids and offers by (rpstac_b and rpstac_s) all left it with potentially very high 
profits. For example, despite increases of bids by (keen_b, smart_s4) from 6, 410, 642, 788 to 891, (rpstac_s and rpstac_b) 
insisted to bid 2 to (progress_b2, pmstub_s).  
Close observation reveals that completion of the vast majority of chains, if they do complete at all, happened on the 
final couple of day limits. Effective propagation of constraints is essential for the completion of a chain. We observed from 
Table 5 that rpstac_s was rather accurate in recognizing deadlines. In the above example, it chose the right time to commit 
itself. But the fact that it was in a position to accept the price 973 was because it was offered the price 703 by its supplier. 
From the negotiation history above, it can be seen that the completion of the chain was brought about by two streams of 
progress: the first stream is the steady raise of bids by psourt_b to (keen_b, smart_s4), and keen_bs steady raise of bids to 
(rpstac_b, rpstac_s). The second stream is the steady drop of offering prices by dgjaco_s to (mjtryh_b, keen_s2), and 
keen_s2s steady drop of offering prices to (rpstac_b, rpstac_s). These two streams of concession gave (rpstac_b, rpstac_s) 
a chance to initiate completion of the chain. Most chains needs two streams of price concessions (not necessarily steady 
prices changes) to complete.  
The hard-bargainers attempt to gain high returns at the risk of not completing chains. Many chains of length 10 (which 
have high probabilities of containing hard-bargainers) did not complete. Results show that all the middlemen that used 
rpstac_b as their buyers obtained above-average performance in chains of all length tested. Note that when a chain does not 
complete, the hard-bargainers are not the only players that lose out  all the players in the chain score zero. Easy-going 
bargainers strategy is to pick up profits in chains that complete. Middlemen who allow others to estimate their bottom-line, 
e.g. (progress_b2, pmstub_s) and (keen_b, pmstub_s), performed reasonably well in the experiments.  
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6 Experiment 3: Chains with Uniform Middlemen 
Aggregate results can hide a lot of facts. To analyse the performance of individual middlemen and their components, we 
conducted experiments on chains with uniform middlemen. This means we only used one buyer and one seller to make up 
each chain. An example of a uniform chain is:  
[pmstub_s, (mjtryh_b, pmstub_s), (mjtryh_b, pmstub_s), , mjtryh_b] 
All 25 combinations of buyers and sellers were tested. The aim was to find out the combinations that make successful 
middlemen  middlemen that perform well in chains that contain only middlemen of their kind. By removing interactions 
between middlemen, our secondary aim is to identify middlemen that failed to complete chain negotiations. 
As before, chains with one, five and ten middlemen were generated. They were run on problems with low as well as 
high profits, which were generated with parameters as descried in the previous section. Each uniform chain of length 1 was 
given 1000 problems to run. Each uniform chain of length 5 and 10 was given 500 problems to run. Importantly, every 
chain of identical length is given the identical set of problems. This allows scores between different chains to be compared 
directly. Results are shown in Table 8. The normalized results are shown in Figure 9. 
 
Table 8: Scores in Uniform Chains  Average Profits Per Game 
Chain Length: 1 1 5 5 10 10 
Parameter Set: p2 p1 p1 p4 p1 p4 
dgjaco_s- 59 149 86 116 46 102 
keen_s2- 28 125 19 47 7 15 
pmstub_s- 43 193 75 101 40 78 
rpstac_s- 26 144 32 60 14 35 
smart_s4- 27 134 68 44 31 60 
keen_b-dgjaco_s 62 200 129 200 53 200 
keen_b-keen_s2 58 359 129 719 61 335 
keen_b-pmstub_s 30 389 81 563 43 257 
keen_b-rpstac_s 42 273 73 414 44 235 
keen_b-smart_s4 63 300 76 686 50 293 
mjtryh_b-dgjaco_s 50 156 81 128 32 107 
mjtryh_b-keen_s2 55 280 56 409 11 80 
mjtryh_b-pmstub_s 10 259 26 203 12 89 
mjtryh_b-rpstac_s 24 184 29 96 8 74 
mjtryh_b-smart_s4 18 207 23 157 11 70 
progress_b2-dgjaco_s 58 132 103 123 26 121 
progress_b2-keen_s2 20 64 24 145 6 46 
progress_b2-pmstub_s 4 232 6 42 4 20 
progress_b2-rpstac_s 8 106 11 48 4 28 
progress_b2-smart_s4 13 124 6 52 3 20 
psourt_b-dgjaco_s 56 200 72 166 35 106 
psourt_b-keen_s2 62 424 62 566 32 171 
psourt_b-pmstub_s 23 321 54 423 35 211 
psourt_b-rpstac_s 27 220 11 65 7 33 
psourt_b-smart_s4 20 207 26 175 14 84 
rpstac_b-dgjaco_s 38 185 57 104 37 98 
rpstac_b-keen_s2 28 260 27 178 8 55 
rpstac_b-pmstub_s 12 301 11 71 6 36 
rpstac_b-rpstac_s 19 266 12 64 7 29 
rpstac_b-smart_s4 25 259 25 148 14 83 
keen_b- 34 226 87 1108 66 827 
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mjtryh_b- 41 378 100 1134 47 720 
progress_b2- 35 291 116 1161 62 904 
psourt_b- 48 381 58 916 42 440 
rpstac_b- 31 445 56 599 35 420 
Mean 34.20 239.26 54.49 320.89 27.23 185.20 
Standard Deviation 17.14 94.05 35.59 335.51 19.16 222.92 
 
Normalized Profit for Uniform Chains
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Figure 9: Normalized profits for players in chains with uniform middlemen 
 
When a uniform chain breaks down, it is caused by breakdown between the only two players involved in the chain. 
Therefore, one should expect results in this experiment to reflect the frequency that the two players fail to agree on prices 
(see Table 5). Results in Figure 9 support this analysis. Of the 25 middlemen, (keen_b, keen_s2), (keen_b, pmstub_s), 
(keen_b, rpstac_s), (keen_b, smart_s4), (psourt_b, pmstub_s) and to a certain extent, (psourt_b, keen_s2) consistently 
scored above average in chains of different length. All but one of them involve keen_b or keen_s2, easy-going players. 
This is consistent with our expectation.  
Also as expected is the fact that the hard-bargainers, rpstac_b and rpstac_s, scored badly in this experiment (except 
when rpstac_s was combined with keen_b). That is because when these middlemen fail to complete a chain, all members of 
the chain are copies of themselves. When a chain with mixed middlemen failed to complete, other middlemen did not score 
either. Therefore, the hard-bargainers relative scores were not damaged by incompletion, as they would in uniform chains. 
Note that results in this experiment should not be used to conclude that hard-bargaining is a poor strategy, because in 
realistic applications, middlemen are likely to be different in the strategies that they use.  
Close observation on the detailed runs reveals that middlemen such as (rpstac_b, rpstac_s) and (rpstac_b, pmstub_s) 
failed to compete most uniform chains with length 5 or 10. Chains were only completed when the days to sell is equal to or 
one above days to buy. In problems other than those, they dropped their offers or raised their bids too late for the other to 
respond. Following shows part of the chain negotiation in a chain with five (rpstac_b, pmstub_s) middlemen. There are 8 
days to sell and 9 days to buy, in a game where cost is 200 and utility is 1,200.  
 
  Page 13 
End-seller: pmstub_s, cost 200 
[-56, +220, -4, +485, -4, +544, -4, +583, -4, +609, -4, +627, -4, +637, -4, +640]  
Middleman 1: (rpstac_b, pmstub_s) 
[-87, +242, -12, +1176, -12, +1479, -12, +1699, -12, +1854, -12, +1964, -12, +2028, -12, +2048] 
Middleman 2: (rpstac_b, pmstub_s) 
[-135, +266, -43, +2851, -40, +4022, -38, +4949, -36, +5646, -34, +6153, -32, +6457, -30, +6554] 
. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Chain Mediator (Version 4.2.1) implements an upper bound on the offer, which is 100 times 
of the utility. In the above run, middleman 5s initial offer to the end-buyer was capped to (1,200x100=) 120,000.  
If we focus on the negotiation between the first and second middlemen, we can see the typical difficulties in this chain 
negotiation. The first middleman was offered 640, which it marked up to 2,048 and offered to the second middleman. The 
first middleman reduced its offer to the second middleman slowly, as pmstub_s does. On the buying stream, the second 
middleman (which had a cost of 30 on day 1) counter-offered 12 to the first middleman. However, rpstac_b kept bidding 12 
to the first middleman, despite gradual (though small) bid reductions by the third middleman. This does not allow the first 
middleman to raise bids to the end-seller. By the time the second middleman raised its bid to the first middleman from 12 
to 87, it was too late for the latter to respond even if 87 was an acceptable price (in this case it was not). In this run, we can 
see that progress was made between middlemen 2 and 3, but this progress did not pass on to the first middleman and 
beyond soon enough. This illustrates the typical difficulties in uniform chains that contain hard bargainers only.  
7 Further Analysis 
We have reported above two sets of experiments: chains with mixed (randomly generated) middlemen and chains with 
uniform middlemen. We have used chains of length 1, 5 and 10 in both sets of experiments. For each chain length, we 
generated problems with low and high profits. To gain a rough idea on how each player performed, we averaged all the 
normalized profits in these experiments. The results of the players in uniform, mixed and all chains are contrasted in Figure 
10.  
 
Average Profit over all games by End Sellers, End Buyers and Middlemen
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Figure 10: Normalized profits for players in all chains 
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The overall picture shows that the buyers are, on average, more successful than the middlemen, who are relatively 
better than the sellers. Amongst the middlemen, (keen_b, pmstub_s) and (psourt_b, pmstub_s) are consistent performers 
over both uniform and random chains. With the exception of (keen_b, pmstub_s), middlemen that involve keen_b were 
good at uniform chain negotiation, but poor in chains with mixed middlemen. Middlemen (mtryh_b, pmstub_s), 
(progress_b2, pmstub_s) and (rpstac_b, pmstub_s) were outstanding in chains with mixed middlemen, but weak in uniform 
chain negotiation.  
Given that different players in the real world tend to use different strategies, are the results in uniform chains relevant to 
the evaluation of middleman strategies? The answer is probably positive. One can imagine that in a dynamic environment, 
where middleman may change their strategies, more middlemen will adopt the successful strategies. This is either because 
weaker middlemen are eliminated, or successful middlemen duplicate themselves, or a combination of both. As more and 
more middlemen adopt the successful strategies, successful middlemen will deal with more and more middlemen that 
resemble themselves. Therefore, middlemen that perform badly in uniform chains will find their performance deteriorate.  
Next, we attempt to find out which sellers and buyers make good components of middlemen. For this purpose, we 
looked at the contribution of each player in all the chains reported above. For example, if middleman (keen_b, dgjaco_s) 
scored a normalized profit of 0.16 in a game, this is credited to both keen_b and dgjaco_s. All the credits are averaged. The 
results are presented in Table 11 and Figure 12. 
 
Table 11: Average normalized results by components over all chains 
Players 
Average over 
individual, 
uniform chains 
Average over 
individual, 
random chains 
Average over 
individual, all 
games 
dgjaco_s- 0.1787 -0.3843 -0.0772 
keen_s2- -0.0430 -0.3700 -0.1916 
pmstub_s- -0.2313 0.6411 0.1653 
rpstac_s- -0.5625 -0.2505 -0.4206 
smart_s4- -0.3696 -0.2364 -0.3091 
keen_b- 0.9419 -0.3612 0.3496 
mjtryh_b- -0.0945 0.1424 0.0132 
progress_b2- -0.4071 0.2517 -0.1076 
psourt_b- 0.0821 0.1331 0.1053 
rpstac_b- -0.2990 0.7859 0.1941 
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Figure 12: Average normalized profits by individuals in chain negotiation 
 
Over all experiments, keen_b and rpstac_b were the best buyers and pmstub_s was the best seller for forming 
middlemen. The success of keen_b was mainly due to its scores in uniform chains. Its performance in chains with mixed 
middlemen was consistent with its performance in pairwise negotiation. The high overall score of both rpstac_b and 
pmstub_s were due to their relative performance in chains with mixed middlemen. They both drive hard bargains by 
conceding slowly. Being reasonably predictable by sophisticated opponents, pmstub_s allows the opponent to compromise 
if it wants to. The success of rpstac_b could be attributed to its sophisticated, fine-tuned strategy. What is less clear is the 
weak performance of rpstac_s, which strategy mirrors rpstac_b. Another interesting observation is that, despite using a 
relatively simple strategy, psourt_b was the only buyer that performed above average in both uniform and mixed chains. 
It is interesting to compare results in Figure 12 to those presented in Figure 3. First it must be noted that the scales in 
the two figures are different. The differences between players are less dramatic in chain negotiations than in pairwise 
negotiations. It is the relative performance that we are focusing on. In chains with mixed middlemen, rpstac_b is as 
successful as it was in pairwise negotiations. The performance of mjtryh_b is somehow diminished in chain negotiation. 
Amongst the sellers, the performance of pmstub_s and rpstac_s were comparable in pairwise negotiation. However, in 
chain negotiation, pmstub_s was outstanding, but rpstac_s was relatively poor.  
8 Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we have focussed on a simple chain constrained bargaining game, CBG(C). The problem is used as a 
platform for studying constraint propagation strategies in adverse situation. While each bargainer attempts to maximize its 
own profit, it has to recognize others time and price constraints if it were to succeed in this game. Within a limited number 
of iterations, bargainers have to propagate their constraints effectively to each other in order to complete a chain.  
A number of hand-coded, rule-based bargainers have been analysed. We can decompose these bargainers into general 
components. These include: 
 The strategy for opening bid  for example, dgjaco_s demands a small profit margin but rpstac_s demands a 
high margin. The opening bids have great impact on the chance of completing a chain; 
 The general strategy for reducing offers / increasing bids  many bargainers in our experiments, including 
progress_b, keen_s2, pmstub_s, keen_b and progress_b2, use rules that are reasonably predictable. This allows 
the opponents to compromise should they want to. However, they also give the opponents chances to exploit 
the information that they give away. Whether this strategy is successful depends on many factors, including the 
length of the chains, the opponents that they face and the type of problems that they were given; 
 The strategy for predicting the opponents bottom line  certain bargainers in our experiments, including 
smart_s4, mjtryh_b, attempt to guess the opponents bottom lines; 
 The strategy for deciding whether to accept an offer/bid when it provides room for profit  keen_b accepts any 
offer that is below its utility; keen_s2 delays for one round; other buyers/sellers, such as pmstub_s and 
mjtryh_b, use more sophisticated rules. 
Experimental results so far revealed the success and weakness of certain strategies in these components (e.g. 
pmstub_ss strategy for reducing prices appears to be successful and progress_b2s criteria for accepting offers that are 
below utility was doubtful).  
The search for good middlemen involves (a) finding the right strategies for each component, (b) finding the right 
combinations of components for each buyer/seller, and (c) finding the right combination of buyers and sellers for each 
middleman. Results in the experiments show that mediocre buyers/sellers can form successful middlemen; for example, 
(progress_b2, pmstub_s). The search space for middlemen is large. If one can identify all the major components in the 
game, and list a sufficient number of sensible strategies for each component, then we have defined a search space of useful 
middlemen. This gives us a chance to explore the search space systematically, e.g. by playing all the buyer-seller 
combinations against each other. It may also be possible to develop adaptive systems which react to the current population 
in the game. 
This research is part of a larger project with business motivations. Many extensions of CBG(C) are worth looking into. 
Following are some examples: 
 In the experiments conducted, the middlemen took the time constraints directly from the end-seller and end-
buyer. For simplicity, the buyer and the seller of a middleman did not exchange and use both the days-to-sell 
and days-to-buy information. In reality, middlemen may have their individual time and other constraints.  
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 Having studied the components in the bargaining agents, we are now in a position to build systems to evolve 
(as opposed to hard-wire) agents for the above bargaining problem, as proposed in [1][3]. 
 Each seller (buyer) can negotiate with more than one buyer (seller) at any time, but with limited bandwidth  in 
this case, it has to decide on when to talk to which buyer (seller).  
 Following the above point, the seller (buyer) may be given n days to sell/buy m pieces of goods  in this case, it 
has to decide what to sell to which buyer (seller) next, and when to stop negotiating with which buyer (seller). 
 Past experience and market information (such as the average profit and the wealth of each agent) could be 
included in the model. 
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